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THE DURATION OF EMERGENCY SEARCHES:
THE INVESTIGATIVE SEARCH AND THE ISSUE
OF RE-ENTRY
EDWARD G. MASCOLO*
I. INTRODUCTION
Reasonableness is the cornerstone' 'and catalyst' of the fourth
amendment. 2 Unfortunately, there exists "no ready litmus-paper
test ' 3 for reasonableness which, of necessity, involves a balancing
of a legitimate public interest in promoting effective law
enforcement against the protection of individual privacy from
arbitrary governmental intrusion. 4 In explaining this somewhat
esoteric concept with any degree of exactitude, the Supreme Court
has made reference both to the more specific dictates of the warrant
clause of the amendment, 5 and to the factual context of a search
and seizure 6 - "the total atmosphere of the case." 7 Thus, the
Court has mandated that, subject to certain exceptions, warrantless
searches are per se unreasonable. 8
Although these exceptions have been characterized variously
*Member of the Connecticut and District of Columbia Bars: Editor in Chief of the Connecticut
Bar Journal, 1969-1973, and currently member of Editorial Board: B. A.. Wesleyan University. 1949:
LL. B., Georgetown University. 1952: currently research consultant to Office of Judicial Education.
Judicial Department. State of Connecticut. The opinions expressed herein are those only of the
author.
1. Cadys. Dombrowski. 413 U. S. 433. 439 (1973), SEE Zurcherv. Stanford Dails, - U.S -.
-98 S. Ct. 1970. 1978 (1978): Pennsylvania s. Mimms. 434 U. S. 106. 108-09 (1977)(per curiam):
United States v. Chadwick, 433 U. S. i.9 (1977).
2. U. S. CONST. amend. IV.
The right of the people to be secure in their persons. houses, papers, and effects.
against unreasonable searches and seizures. shall not be violated, and no Warrants
shall issue, but upon probable cause. supported by Oath or affirmation, and par-
ticularly describing the place to be searched, and the persons or things to be seized.
Id.
3. United States v. Rabinowitz. 339 U. S. 56, 63 (1950).
4. Pennsylvania v. Mimms. 434 U. S. at 109.
5. South Dakota v. Opperman. 428 U. S. 364. 381 (1976)(Powcll. J., concurring)(dictunm):
Cad' s. Dombrowski. 413 U. S. at 451 (Brennan. ... dissenting): United States v. United States
Dist. Court. 407 U. S. 297. 315 (1972).
6. See Cooper v. California, 386 U. S. 58. 59 (1967).
7. United States v. Rabinowitz. 339 U. S. at 66.
8. Katz v. United States. 389 U. S. 347. 357 (1967). This emphasis upon the need for a warrant
has led to a certain tension with the reasonableness clause, for unless warrantlcss search activity falls
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as "specifically established and well-delineated,'" 9 "carefully
defined," 10 and "carefully drawn,"" they rarely have received
analytical treatment from the Court. This has prompted the
comment that the branch of the law dealing with the
constitutionality of warrantless searches "is something less than a
seamless web.' 1 2 Thus, while the exceptions to the warrant
requirement have been recognized explicitly, they have not always
been analyzed thoroughly, thereby resulting in a blurring of the
general rule and its exceptions. Recently, however, there has been
a significant shift in this pattern.
The primacy of the warrant requirement is most pronounced
in the home.1 3 It is for this reason that the conflict between the
requirement and its exceptions is most intense within this setting of
sharp conflict between the legitimate needs of law enforcement and
the right of the individual to be free from arbitrary interference by
governmental officials. And it is here that this conflict is further
aggravated by certain activities particularly favored by law
enforcement agencies - the investigative search and the re-entry of
the scene of a serious crime after an initial legal presence.
The focus of this study will be directed to an analysis of the
duration of an important exception to the warrant requirement -
the emergency doctrine - with particular emphasis devoted to the
investigative search and the issue of re-entry in a manner that will
demonstrate the crucial need for the preservation of individual
privacy.
II. THE DURATION OF EMERGENCY SEARCHES
A. CHIMEL V. CALIFORNIA AND THE PRIMACY OF THE WARRANT
CLAUSE
The emergency doctrine, which mandates that the scope of
permissible search be correlated with the degree or type of exigency
wiI h in one of the exceptions to the warrant requirement. it will be invalidated. even though it might
otherw'ise have been reasonable. See People %-. Smith. 7 Cal. 3d 282. 286. 496 P.2d 1261. 1263. 101
Cal. Rptr. 893. 895 (1972): State v. Brothers. 4 Ore. App. 253, -. 478 P.2d 442, 444 (1970).
9. Katz \. United States. 389 U. S. at 357.
10. Camara v. NMicipal Court. 387 U. S. 523. 528 (1967).
11. Jonesv. United States. 357 U. S. 493. 499 (1958).
12. Cadv Dombrowski. 413 U. S. at 440.
13. Uni'ted States '. Nlartinez-Fuerte. 428 U. S. 543. 561 (1967)(dictumn). SFF Nlincev v.
Arizona. - U. S. -. . 98 S. Ct. 2408. 2414 (1978): United States v. United States Dist. Court.
407 U. S. at 313.
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confronting law enforcement officers 14 has particular relevance to
the sanctity of the home, for it is there that the individual's
expectation of privacy is most sensitive and pronounced. A man's
house is more than just his castle: it is the repository of all of his
most personal possessions, papers, and effects - the ultimate
sanctuary from the prying eye of both stranger and government. 15
It is for these reasons that "physical entry of the home is the chief
evil against which the wording of the [f]ourth [a]mendment is
directed,'1 6 and that [a]bsent some grave emergency,' 1 7 "a
warrant traditionally has been required" for "the search of private
residences. "18 Therefore, the "degree of intrusion upon
privacy ... occasioned by a search of a house" dictates "the strong
[f]ourth [a]mendment interests that justify the warrant
requirement in that context,"' 19 for residences normally are
accorded the maximum protection of privacy interests under the
fourth amendment. 20 It is within this context that the case of Chimel
v. California21 has particular relevance.
Prior to Chimel, the Court, in United States v. Rabinowitz, 22
overruled the requirement laid down in Trupiano v. United States, 23
that a search warrant is required whenever it is practicable to
obtain one, and substituted therefor a rule of reasonableness which
placed primary emphasis upon the police conduct under attack by
evaluating that activity in terms of "the total atmosphere of the
case." '2 4 The Court framed the rule in the following terms: "The
relevant test is not whether it is reasonable to procure a search
warrant, but whether the search was reasonable. That criterion in
turn depends upon the facts and circumstances -- the total
atmosphere of the case. "25
In deflecting the Trupiano emphasis upon the primacy of the
warrant clause, the Court, in Rabinowitz, for the first time detached
14. See Mincey v. Arizona, - U. S. at -. 98 S. Ct. at 2414: Warden v. Hayden. 387 U. S. 294,
299 (1967).
15. See generally Boyd v. United States, 116 U. S. 616, 630 (1886) (dictum): J. LANDYNSKI,
SEARCH & SEIZURE AND THE SUPRFIE COURT: A STUDY IN CONSTITUTIONAL INTERPRETATION 60-61
(1966).
16. United States v. United States Dist. Court. 407 U. S. at 313.
17. McDonald v. United States. 335 U. S. 451. 455 (1948)(emphasis added).
18. United States v. Martinez-Fuerte, 428 U. S. at 565 (dictum).
19. Id.
20. Id. at 561 (dictum): Dorman v. United States. 435 F.2d 385. 389 (D. C. Cir. 1970): People
v Dumas. 9 Cal. 3d 871. 882 ' n.8. 512 P.2d 1208. 1215-16 1 n.8. 109 Cal. Rptr. 304. 311-12 ' n.8
(1973)(dictum).
21. 395 U. S. 752 (1969).
22. 339 U. S. 56 (1950).
23. 334U. S. 699(1948).
24. United States v. Rabinowitz. 339 U. S. 56. 66(1950).
25. Id.
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the reasonableness clause from the warrant requirements and
permitted the reasonableness of a warrantless search to be
determined independently of the warrant clause. 26 Thus, the
search incident to an arrest exception, under review, was justified
as an integral part of the reasonableness clause rather than as an
historical exception to the warrant requirement, 27 and could
reasonably extend to 'and throughout' the area within the
"possession" of or under the "control" of the arrestee. 28
And so matters stood until 1969, when the Court was called
upon to reassess the continued vitality of Rabinowitz. In that year it
decided the case of Chimel v. California, 29 wherein it restricted the
scope of the search incident exception to the person of the arrestee
and the area within his immediate reach.30 In doing so, however,
the Court went beyond the specifics of the case and articulated, in
broad strokes upon a slate wiped clean by its penetrating critique of
Rabinowitz and its progeny, a rule of profound significance for the
privacy of the home.
Concerned about the ever widening scope of the incidental
search, a strong motivating factor behind delayed arrests in
residences, and stressing the "crucial part" that the warrant
requirements play in the constitutional scheme of preventing
unreasonable searches, the Court overruled Rabinowitz and
restored the primacy of the warrant clause.31 It reasoned that unless
meaningful restrictions were imposed upon the scope of incidental
searches, fourth amendment protections would be reduced to "the
evaporation point," thereby leading to the removal of any
"rational limitation" upon such conduct. 32 Therefore, the scope of
a search, supported, "whenever practicable," by a warrant, was to
be correlated with the purpose for which it was intitially justified,
and was to be determined by scrutinizing the surrounding facts and
circumstances "in the light of established [f]ourth [a]mendment
principles."33
These inherent restrictions, as well as the rationale of Chimel,
that the warrant clause takes precedence over the reasonableness
26.1. LANDYNSKI. Supra note 15 at 109.
27. Id.
28. 339 U. S. at 63-64. In the case ofan arrest within a home. the rule would allow a full search
ofthe residence. SceChitnel v. California. 395 U. S. at 760. 766.
29. 395 U. S. 752 (1969).
30. Id. at 763.
31. Id. at 761. 762. 764-66. 768. The "total atmosphere'" standard espoused in Rabinouitz was
not rejected in Chhinl. Se 395 U. S. at 765. Rather. the Court chose to evaluate this standard in ter-
ms ofthe primacy ofthe warrant clause. Secrid. at 761. 763. 765. 768.
32. Id. at 765. 766.
33. Id. at 762. 765.
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clause, in that the latter is but an exception to the warrant
requirement rather than a co-equal standard by which the validity
of a search is to be measured, 34 are relevant to the scope of
emergency searches 35 and to their execution after an emergency has
ended. Thus, Chimel will restrict emergency searches both in scope
and in time, so that they will be limited to their initial justification,
and will cease upon the termination of that purpose. 36
34. Farrar, Aspects of Police Search and Seizure Without Warrant in England and the United States, 29 U.
MIAMI L. REV. 491, 525(1975).
35. See Mascolo, The Emergency Doctrine Exception to the Warrant Requirement Under the Fourth Amend-
ment, 22 BUFF. L. REV. 419, 432 n.56 (1973). See also People v. Mitchell, 39 N. Y.2d 173, 177-78,
179, 347 N. E.2d 607, 609, 610, 383 N. Y. S.2d 246, 248, 249 (1976), cert. denied, 426 U. S. 953
(1976).
36. See Mincey v. Arizona, - U. S. at -, 98 S. Ct. at 2413, 2414-15; United States v. Young,
553 F. 2d 1132, 1134 (8th Cir. 1977), cert. denied, 431 U. S. 959 (1977); State v. Brothers, 4 Ore.
App. at -, 478 P.2d at 444-45.
Some comments on the continued vitality of Chimel are in order. It has been argued that the for-
ce of Chimel's endorsement of the primacy of the warrant clause has been severely impaired by sub-
sequent decisions of the Supreme Court. Farrar, supra note 34 at 525;Comment, Searches Incidcnt to
Arrest: The Expanding Exception to the Warrant Requirement, 63 GEo. I.J. 223, 230-32, 237-38 (1974).
This interpretation is accurate only as to place. For example, the warrantless searches and seizures
upheld in following cases: United States v. Edwards, 415 U. S. 800 (1974)(search at jailhouse);
Gustafson v. Florida, 414 U. S. 260 (1973)(arrest and search of motorist); United States v. Robin-
son, 414 U S. 218 (19 7 3)(arrest and search of motorist), took place in either public or semi-public
areas, and did not exceed the scope limitations imposed by Chimel. And the same can be said of sub-
sequent decisions. E. g., Pennsylvania v. Mimms, 434 U. S. 106 (1977)(ordering motorist out of
vehicle for traffic offense); United States v. Watson, 423 U. S. 411 (1976)(arrest in public area); Car-
dwell v. Lewis, 417 U. S. 583 (1974)(examination of exterior of motor vehicle). However, in
repeated dicta, the Supreme Court has recognized that the individual's expectation of privacy
(which, while subjective, is objectively evaluated by the courts, United States v. Freie, 545 F.2d
1217, 1223 (9th Cir. 1976) cert. denied, 430 U. S. 966 (1977); see Katz v. United States, 389 U. S. at
361 (Harlan, J., concurring), in public areas is "significantly less than that relating to one's
home .... " South Dakota v. Opperman, 428 U. S. at 367; Cardwell v. Lewis, 417 U. S. 583, 589-
90 (1974)(plurality opinion): Coolidge v. New Hampshire. 403 U. S. 443, 474 (1971)(plurality
opinion); Chambers v. Maroney, 399 U. S. 42, 48, 52 (1970); Dyke v. Taylor Implement Mfg. Co.,
391 U. S. 216, 221 (1968); Cooper v. California, 386 U. S. at 59; Preston v. United States, 376 U. S.
364, 366-67 (1964); Carroll v. United States, 267 U. S. 132. 153 (1925). SEE Brinegar v. United
States, 338 U. S. 160, 176 (1949); .ohnson v. United States, 333 U. S. 10, 15 (1948). Moreover, the
type of protection that the fourth amendment affords the individual "requires reference to a 'place'."
Katz. v. United States, 389 U. S. 347, 361 (1967) (Harlan, J., concurring). Residences are ac-
corded the maximum protection of privacy interests under the amendment. United States v. Mar-
tinez-Fuerte, 428 U. S. at 561 (dictum); Dorman v. United States, 435 F.2d at 389; People v.
Dumas, 9 Cal. 3d at 882 ' n. 8,512 P.2d at 1215-16 ' n.8, 109 Cal Rptr. at 311-12 & n.8 (dictum).
Finally, the Court has recently and strongly intimated that it will not entertain a reduction of
warrant standards for residential, and other private property, searches. See Mincey v. Arizona, - U.
S. at -. 98 S.Ct. at 2414. United States v. Martinez-Fuerte, 428 U. S. at 561, 565 (dictum); South
Dakota v. Opperman, 428 U, S. at 381 (Powell, J.. concurring)(clictum): United States v. Watson,
423 U. S. 411, 433 (1976)(Stewart, J., concurring)(dictum): id. at 432-33 (Powell, J., con-
curring)(dictum): United States v. United States Dist. Court. 407 U. S. at 315 & n. 16. In view of the
foregoing, it would appear that Chimel's premise, that the warrant and reasonableness clauses are not
co-equal standards, remains inviolate in the realm ofwarrantless searches of private premises.
Of Final relevance to the scope of the search incident exception, and to the emergency search. is
the presence of third parties at the scene ofan arrest, and the concomitant issue of impoundment. In
such an eventuality, it has been argued that only specific and well-dilineated searches extending
beyond the scope of incidental searches should be permitted. Thus, to prevent police abuses and
assure the preservation of an arrestee's fourth amendment rights. w\ithout unduly hampering the
legitimate need of law enforcement officers to prevent the destruction of evidence, it has been urged
that pat-down searches be permitted when the police have a reasonable suspicion that a third party is
armed or dangerous. and that the area near third parties be accessible to the police for search pur-
poses when they possess articulable and specific knowledge creating, again, a reasonable suspicion
that such individuals may use or reach for a %%capon. Aaronson & Wallace, A Reconsideration s/the
Fourth 4nendment's Doctrine ofSearch Incident to Arrest. 64 GEo. 1..J. 53. 77-78 (1975). In the absence of
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B. THE CONCEPT OF EMERGENCY
A word [or doctrine] is not a crystal, transparent
and unchanged, it is the skin of a living thought
and may vary greatly in color and content
according to the circumstances and the time in
which it is used. 7
Since an emergency presents such a myriad of variables,38 and
because some of the concepts embodied in it escape definition in the
abstract, it does not lend itself to a simplistic meaning. In short, it is
a word of art rather than of precision. Consequently, it has eluded a
definitive explanation by the courts, and must be determined on an
,'itiher of Ihest' factual criteria. no other warrantl'ss searches of third pitlies shoul le sancttioned. Id.
at 78. 1In Still, ite requirement of lirobable eause should a tpy all hroad rt a searches to'pres ent
the possible tiesitntitu of evidettce by third parlis. for the balance between sciety's iotet ees in
promoting cflective law ttl'orell(nt aid the right of' privacy girotte'd uider the fotuth aricnd-
ment is identical whether the preservation of evidence is threatened either by the arrestee or by his
tolfederttes, friends, o( relat ives. Id.
ro reduce police abuses arising frorn the pontial threat of wa rra it less scalches without
probable cause, it has been proposed that impounding a dwelling where an arrest has been made
would pose less of a threat to privacy. Note, Police Practices and the Threatened Destru ction of Tangible
Evidence, 84 HARV. L. REV. 1465, 1474-76 (1971). The suggested guidelines for such action are
probable cause to search, restrictions as unobtrusive as possible and lasting no longer than the tinie
trnired to obtain a warrant, and a specified tire litit, Id. at 1477-81. To guard against potential
I arassienrt, it has also been proposed that the occupants should he fiee to remain within or to leave
ilie dwelling unless, t)f course, the ificers have )robahle cause to believe that they are removing or
desroying weapons. contraband. or other evidenrice ftcritnte, or pose a threat to do so. Id, at 1478. In
either event, the officers may tiake an imtediate I ergency starch. Sec United States v. Santana,
427 U. S. 38, 43 (1976). However, if the occupants exercise their right to tlepart. the police should be
pe'r tiitted th c heck immediately to see if anyone else has remained behind. 84 HArv. L. REV,. at 1478
r.58.
Of particular relevance to the emergency doctrine are tilt' tim' limnitations for itmpundment. As
Ito these, the e'dito~rs oftlt"th Harv~ard Lott, Rev'iew concede tile str'ain~s that would be p~laced up~on judicial
admtinlistration iln ru~ral ar~eas, anld have p~roposed (flai police( (depatmettnts wvork toward mnodernizing
Iprocedurtes for obtaining warrants qit kly enough to accomplish a lawfrul impotndment Id. at 1478-79. 1,-81. However. while ackntwledgit,g a judicial relcitance to iriptise naxiititii inte limitatitons.
they have rot addressed themselves to tit' issue of* the limited firtlds available in nav rural ct iU-Illunitit's for adeqtett police resocr(es Io) quickly effect inipoundinclit: nor" hav,,e they'\ c't)lsidled tile
po(ssib~ility tlfin tiltC l emrgencies. /I/. ;1t 1479.
37. ''wne v. F isntr. 245 U. S. tilt. 425 (1918)(Htlhiues.J.).
ill Set' Unitd States v. Rubin. 474 F.2d 262. 268 (3d Cir. 1972). tirt dlllld. 414 U. S. 833
(19731). A rong the variali's are the l ile i't ' icritne: tillt' attre. .ra\ ity. a.rt duraition f tlthe ,ffitlse
ai its re'st tint irvi'stigation: tilt tl ger Ito iri tsigating toffi t'ers: till' tt'g't't (if llle it o in lvhed.
andl dic little re'qutfied to obhtain at warrant: ilhe ty e )1 ''vi(dtlt'e snll+iect ito seizure, and (lte threat that
it will litc. o)r is beinlg, remo(vedl or <h'strovvd: Ilc (' moliliiv o)ftht' object to1 het searche~d: andI tile de'gree
it'avfilas )ility en'ii iv forct ient and it ittlit iar it'Slittt'(''S. S'i id.: St\sellS v. State, 143 P.2d 600. 602-
03 (Alas. 1968), cert. denied, 393 U. S. 1039 (1969); State v. Mankel, 27 Ariz. App. 436, -, 555 P.2d
1124, 1127-28 (2d Div. 1976); People v. Sirhan, 7 Cal. 3d 710, 739, 497 P.2d 1121, 1140, 102 Cal.
Rptr. 385, 404 (1972), cert. denied, 410 U. S. 947 (1973); Brown v. State, 475 S. W. 2d 938,950 (Tex.
rint. App. 1971): Stir' v. Oakt's. 121 Vt. 211. -. 276 A.2d 1I. 25. Crt. dcnicd. 404 U. S. 965
(1971). See .gncral/),. C tadv v. l')tiitlrl) ski. .t1: U. S. at .1417: id. ; 1 453 (B3reint i .it .. dissenting):
Ptrineglar v.Unittl Stti's. 338 U. S. at 183 (Jti'ks)ir. [... tiissi'rintg)(tiictnn): Unrited Stit's
C:alhotn. 542 1'.2d 10194. 1 102 (9)It Ci. 197 6 ). it'cl. drttd. .429 U. S. 1064 (1977): \'irgirt Islads v.
(;e'e'itI., 502 F.21 914t. 9211 ( 'rd (it-. 1975). crt. de'd. 421 .S. 909 ( 1975): Sanmpile v. Fs iallt. 46!)
I".2d 819. 1122 ((lh (ir. 1972): Kaplan,. 77r' Litits f thl l'tlsiona', Rile. 26 Sr .I  R s. 1027,
1136-7. 10,16-1) ( 1974,t): N e lot I andIl/,' ' & . na'i l es, ri rr%,', f. l I ttonDi's. 87 I-tIll I.. L.R E .835 .1852. 853'. ( 197-1): Nolie, Police Practics and the" Thw'ah'nad 1),sti,fi'tio f 7+in ,dihD" Ev.r,. 8 1 1 1.\r\ .I..
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ad hoc basis. 39 Therefore, to catch its import, the better practice is to
fashion a definition tailored to the different factual circumstances in
which an emergency has been recognized and applied judicially.
Within this framework, the doctrine of emergency 40 may be
defined as follows: Law enforcement officers may enter private
premises without either an arrest or a search warrant in "hot (or
prompt) pursuit" of a fleeing suspect;4 1 to arrest, or to prevent the
imminent escape of, a dangerous criminal, or to seize hazardous
evidence, on the basis of probable cause to believe that either the
suspect, the possessor, or the materials are within the premises, and
time is of the essence so as to realistically preclude recourse to a
warrant; 42 to prevent the actual, or imminently threatened loss,
destruction, or removal of seizable evidence;4 3 to preserve life or
property or to render first aid and assistance, provided they have
reasonable grounds to believe that there is an urgent need for such
assistance and protective action, or to promptly launch a limited
investigation involving a substantial and continuing threat of
imminent danger to either life, health, or property, and provided,
further, that they do not enter, in any such instance, with a pre-
determined intent either to arrest or to seach; 44 to protect the
REV. 1465, 1478-79 (1971). As will be observed, the degree of availability of law enforcement in-
vestigative resources can be irrelevant to the concept of emergency. See text at -, infra.
39. See United States v. Morrow, 541 F.2d 1229, 1232 (7th Cir. 1976), cert. denied, 430 U. S. 933
(1977): People v. Ramey, 16 Cal. 3d 263, 276, 545 P.2d 1333, 1341. 127 Ca. Rptr. 629, 637 (1976),
cert. denied, 429 U. S. 929 (1976).
40. It is synonymous with an exigency or exigent circumstances. United States v. Easter, 552
F.2d 230, 233 (8th Cir. 1977); Root v. Cauper, 438 F.2d 361, 364, 365 (8th Cir. 1971). See Mc-
Donald v. United States, 335 U. S. at 454, 455 (dictum); People v. Ramey, 16 Cal. 3d, at 276. 545
P.2d at 1341, 127 Cal. Rptr. at 637 (1976); People v. Mitchell, 39 N. Y.2d at 177, 347 N. E.2d at
609. 383 N. Y. S2d at 248. Although the Supreme Court has intimated a distinction between
"emergency" or "exigent circumstances" and "hot pursuit," e. g., United States v. Santana. 427
U. S. at 43 n.3; seeG. M. Leasing Corp. v. United States, 429 U. S. 338, 358 n.21 (1977)(dictum):
Vale v. Louisiana, 399 U. S. 30, 35 (1970)(dictum), it is submitted that the latter concept, which is
premised upon urgency, the essence of any emergency, is but an example of the emergency doctrine.
41. United States v. Santana, 427 U. S. at 42-43: Warden v. Hayden, 387 U. S. at 298-99: Mc-
Donald v. United States, 335 U. S. at 455 (dictum):.Johnson v. United States. 333 U. S. at 15 (dic-
tuin).
42. See Minces v. Arizona, - U. S. at -, 98 S. Ct. at 2414: Rice v. Wolf. 513 F.2d 1280, 1294.
1296 (8th Cir. 1975), rev'd on other grounds subnom. Stone v. Powell, 428 U. S. 465 (1976): United
States v. Petty. No. 73-1582 (10th Cir. May 28. 1974). cert. denied, 419 U. S. 1009 (1974): Dorman v.
United States, 435 F.2d at 390. 391. 392-93: People v. Ramev. 16 Cal. 3d at 276, 545 P.2d at 1341.
127 Cal. Rptr. at 637: Commonwealth v. LeBlanc. 367 N. E. 2d 846, 851 (Mass. 1977). See avo
United States v. Calhoun, 542 F.2d at 1102 (dictui).
43. Mincey v. Arizona, - U. S. at - 98 S. Ct. at 2414-15 (dictum): G. M. leasing Corp. v.
United States. 429 U. S. at 361-62 (Burger. C. J.. conCurring)(dictum): United States v. Guidry,
534 F.2d 1220. 1223 (6th Cir. 1976). Sec United States v. Santana, 427 U. S. at 43: Vale v.
Louisiana. 399 U. S. at 35 (dictum): United States v..Jcffers. 342 U. S. 48. 52 (1951) (dictum): MC-
Donald v. United States. 335 U. S. at 455 (dictum): .Johnson v. United States. 333 U. S. at 15 (dic-
tum): United States v. Brewer. 343 F. Supp. 468, 472-73 (D. Hawaii 1972). See gencrally Note.
Residentia/ Searches to Pretlent the Destruction ofEvidence: An Emeing Exception to the ll"arrant Reqtirrremnt, 47
U. Cot.o. 1. REV'. 517 (1976). See also United States v. Wysong. 528 F.2d 345. 348 (9th Cir. 1976):
Thotnas v, United States. 352 A.2d 390. 391 (D. C. Ct. Ann. 1976).
44. Mincev v. Arizona. - U. S. at -, 98 S. Ct. at 2413-14: ;earv v. State, 91 Nev. 784. - &
n. 3. 544 P.2d 417. 421 & n. 3 (1975): State v. Hardin, 90 Nev. 10, -, 518 P.2d 151, 153-54 (1974):
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premises ai s _- feony in progress n to conduct a
reasonable inspection to determine the cause of a fire while it is still
burning, or reasonably following its suppression, and to seize
evidence either relevant to the cause of the blaze or of an unrelated
crime inadvertently discovered.
46
As long as there is a reasonable basis for the belief upon which
the entry is predicated, it will be sustained, even if it is later shown
that no emergency existed. 47  Since time is crucial under the
doctrine, it would be unreasonable to require a warrant prior to
entry.
The doctrine will not permit the entry of, and search by,
additional investigators immediately or shortly after the initial
entry, while investigative control of the premises is still current,
and after termination of the emergency, even though the
subsequent intrusion is limited to the scope of (or the purpose for)
the original invasion. 48
By itself, probable cause is insufficient to justify either an
emergency entry upon or search of private premises. 49 There also
must be present exigent circumstances. Therefore, an emergency
search of a private residence can be justified only when the police
are confronted with both probable cause and an exigency.
50
People v. Mitchell, 39 N. Y.2"d at 177, 178-79, 347 N. E.2d at 609, 610. 383 N. Y. S.2d at 248", 249.
See McDonald v. United States. 335 U. S. at 454 (dictum): United States v. Brand. 556 F.2d 1312,
1318 (5th Cir. 1977). cert. denied, - U. S. -. 98 S. Ct. 1237 (1978): United States v. Petty, No. 73-
1582 (10th Cir. May 28, 1974). cert. denied, 419 U. S. 1009 (1974): United States v. Goldenstein, 456
F.2d 1006, 1010-11 (8th Cir. 1972). cert. denied, 416 U. S. 943 (1974); United States v. Barone, 330
F.2d 543. 545 (2d Cir. 1964), cert. denied, 377 U. S. 1004 (1964); Wayne v. United States, 318 F.2d
205, 212 (D.C. Cir. 1963)(Burger, J., concurring)(dictum), cert. denied, 375 U.S. 860 (1963); People
v. Ramev. 16 Cal. 3d at 276, 545 P.2d at 1341. 127 Cal. Rptr. at 637: People v. Smith, 7 Cal. 3d at
286, 496 P.2d at 1263. 101 Cal. Rptr. at 895: People v. Roberts. 47 Cal. 2d 374, 378-79. 303 P.2d
721. 723 (1956): Patrick v. State, 227 A.2d 486. 489 (Del. 1967): Davis v. State, 236 Md. 389. 395-
98, 204 A.2d 76. 80-81 (1964). cere. denied. 380 U. S. 966 (1965): ALt MODEL CODE OF PRE-
ARRAIGNIENT PROCEDURE 5 SS 260.5. at 164-65 (1975). See also United States v. Jeffers, 342 U. S. at
52 (dictum): UnitedStatesv. Smith. 515 F.2d at 1031: Wilgus. Arrest Withouta Warrant. 22 MICH. L.
REx. 541. 702-03 (1924).
45. United States v. Estese, 479 F.2d 1273. 1274 (6th Cir. 1973): People v. Solario. 19 Cal. 3d
760. 763-64. 566 P.2d 627, 629. 139 Cal. Rptr. 725, 727 (1977).
46. See Michigan v. Tyler, - U. S. -, -. 98 S. Ct. 1942. 1950-51 (1978): United States v.
Gargotto. 510 F.2d 409. 411-12 (6th Cir. 1974). cert. denied. 421 U. S. 987 (1975): Steigler v. An-
derson. 496 F.2d 793. 797-98 (3d Cir. 1974). cert. denied, 419 U. S. 1002 (1974): United States v.
Green. 474 F.2d 1385. 1389-90 (5th Cir. 1973). cert. denied. 414 U. S. 829 (1973). See also Bailey v.
Michigan. 493 F.2d 1218. 1220 (6th Cir. 1974). cert. dented. 419 U. S. 858 (1974). For a com-
prehensive analysis of the problems confronting law enforcement officers who effectuate warrantless
entries to conduct arson investigations. see People v. Tyler. 399 Mich. 564. -. 250 N. W. 2d 467.
473-77 (1977). aff'd. - U. S. -, 98 S. Ct. 1942 (1978). Since an emergency search is an exception to
the warrant requirement. the burden of proof will rest with the prosecution to justify the same.
United States v. Easter. 552 F.2d at 233: Root v. Gauper. 438 F.2d at 364.
47. Wayne v. United States. 318 F.2d at 212 (Burger, J.. concurring)(dictum): Patrick v. State.
227 A. 2d 486. 489 (Del. 1967).
48. United States v. Young. 553 F.2d 1132. 1134 (8th Cir. 1977). ert. denied. 431 U. S. 959
(1977). SeeMincevv. Arizona. - U. S. at -. 98S. Ct. at 2414.
49. United States v. Rubin. 474 F.2d at 268."
50. United States v. Pacheco-Ruiz. 549 F.2d.1204. 1207-08 app. (9th Cir. 1976). See State v.
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Finally, once an exigency has ended, no further emergency
search-and-seizure activity will be permitted, and a warrant must
be sought.5
In summary, the emergency doctrine permits quick responsive
action on the part of law enforcement officers. Under its sanction,
they are authorized to gain warrantless entry to private premises
and to promptly conduct a limited investigation. This inquiry must
bear "a material relevance to the initial purpose for their entry," 52 ,
and its scope must be reasonably correlated with such purpose."
Although the doctrine will sanction a prompt examination of the
scene of an emergency, and will permit a limited search for and
seizure of both individuals and incriminating evidence, 54 it will not
authorize the police to substitute their judgment for that of an
impartial magistrate after the exigency has ceased to exist; and this
is no small distinction.5 5 Therefore, upon the termination of the
supporting basis for the warrantless presence, the police must cease
any further search activity and must seek a warrant.
III. THE INVESTIGATIVE SEARCH AND MINCEY V.
ARIZONA
The investigative search is concerned with the circumstances
leading up to and surrounding the incident that justifies the initial
presence. Because of this nexus, it is a logical outgrowth of the
emergency that gave rise to the police response. However, there is a
critical difference between the two.
In an emergency, time is crucial to the health and welfare of
both victim and officer. It is this unique quality of an exigency that
justifies, and requires, prompt and immediate responsive conduct
Mankel, 27 Ariz. App. 436, -. 555 P.2d 1124, 1127 (2d Div. 1976): Lohman v. Superior court, 69
Cal. App. 3d 894, 905. 138 Cal. Rptr. 403, 409-10 (4th Dist. 1977).
51. United States v. Young. 553 F.2d at 1134; Sample v. Eyman, 469 F.2d 819, 822 (9th Cir.
1972): Root v. Gauper, 438 F.2d at 365: State v. Mankel, 27 Ariz.,App. at -. 555 P.2l at 1127-28.
People v. Williams, 557 P.2d 399, 404-05 (Colo. 1976), People v. Tyler. 399 Mich. -. -, 250 N.
W. 2d at 474, 477; State v. Brothers, 4 Ore. App. at -___ 478 P.2d at 444; State v. Davidson, 44
Wis. 2d 177, -_, 170 N. W. 2d 755, 765. SeeMincey v. Arizona, __U. S. at __98 S. Ct. 2414-
15.
52. Mascolo. The Emergency Doctrine Exception to the Warrant Requirement Under the Fourth Amendment,
22 BUFF, L. REV. 419, 426-27 (1973). See Mincey v. Arizona, - U. S. at -, 98 S. Ct. at 2414; Terry
v. Ohio. 392 U. S. 1. 19 (1968): Warden v. Hayden. 387 U. S. at 299.
53. Mincey v. Arizona, - U. S. at -, 98 S. Ct. at 2414. United States v. Brand, 556 F.2d at
1318: Gearv v. State. 91 Nev. at -. 544 P.2d at 421: People v. Mitchell, 39 N. Y.2d at 177-78, 347
N. E.2d at 609, 383 N. Y. S.2d at 248.
54. See Mincey v. Arizona, - U. S. at - 98 S. Ct. at 2413-14: Warden v. Hayden. 387 U. S.
at 298-99.
55. See Mincey v. Arizona, - U. S. at -. 98 S. Ct. at 2415: McDonald v. United States, 335
U. S. at 455-56: Trupiano %. United States. 334 U. S. 699, 710 (1948).
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on the part of the police, in order to effectively counteract the dangers
inherent in any exigent situation. In this posture, exigent
circumstances take precedence over the warrant requirement.
An investigative search, however, is not concerned with foiling
any dangers. It commences only after the termination of the
exigency, and is concerned with past, not current, events and
circumstances leading up to and surrounding the emergency. It is
in this sense that the investigative search is to be distinguished from
the emergency search, which is concerned with the natural
consequences flowingfrom an exigency. It is further distinguishable,
in that the investigative search frequently partakes of a gathering of
evidence of crime. Although an emergency search can have an
investigative purpose, it is one that can be rationalized only in
terms of the legitimate concerns of the emergency itself. Thus, such
a search is correlated with, and limited by, the exigency that
justifies it. In the case of the investigative search, however, time is
neither critical nor pressing, for the police are no longer confronted
with a viable emergency. And it is within this context and time
frame that the warrant requirement reassumes its precedence over
the efficient and simplified demands of law enforcement.
In a decision of far-reaching significance for the primacy of the
warrant requirement, the Supreme Court held, in Mincey v.
Arizona, 56 that law officers may not engage in investigative searches
without a warrant at the scene of a crime after an emergency has
terminated, and in the absence of objective criteria pointing to the
loss, destruction, or removal of evidence during the time required
to obtain a warrant, or suggesting that a warrant could not easily
have been obtained. 57 The facts revealed that Officer Headricks of
the Tucson Metropolitan Area Narcotics Squad, in the company of
nine other policemen, gained separate entry to petitioner's
apartment to make a narcotics purchase. While in the bedroom,
Officer Headricks was shot as the other policemen were forcing
their way into the apartment. They discovered Headricks and
petitioner, who was wounded and apparently unconscious, as well
as some acquaintances of petitioner, and requested emergency
assistance. However, they did not engage in any search or
investigative activities, pursuant to a Tucson Police Department
56. - U. S. -. 98 S. Ct. 2408.
57. Id. at 2414-15 (unaniious opinion as to tie fourth atntendttMetit claitt). The only exception
to tIhe termination of investigativ e searches will be in the case of (ttermining the cause of a fire. Src
Michigan v. Tyler. 98 S. Ct. 1942. 1950 (1978). which also diSsuses the i1 estigati\ search. Id. at
1950-51 & n.6.
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directive prohibiting police officers from investigating incidents
involving themselves.
Within ten minutes, homicide detectives, who had received a
radio report of the shooting, arrived and took charge of the
investigation. After supervising the removal of Headricks and the
suspects, the detectives subjected petitioner's entire apartment to
an exhaustive search, without benefit of a warrant, that stretched
over a period of four days, and that involved the seizure of two to
three hundred objects.
In affirming the denial of petitioner's motion to suppress, the
Supreme Court of Arizona endorsed the search of a homicide scene
to determine the circumstances of death as an additional, and
separate, exception to the warrant requirement, provided the
search was "reasonable," involved "the scene of a homicide - or
of a serious personal injury with likelihood of death where there is
reason to suspect foul play-," and was commenced within "a
reasonable period" after the police first learned of the incident, and
after they had legally arrived on the scene. 58
The United States Supreme Court reversed. First, the Court
reaffirmed the mandate of Katz v. United States, 9 that all
warrantless searches are per se unreasonable, subject only to certain
exceptions. 60 It then proceeded to examine the reasons advanced by
the prosecution in support of the search.
The first contention made was that the search did not invade
any constitutionally protected right of privacy, because either
Mincey had forfeited any reasonable expectation of privacy in his
apartment by shooting Officer Headricks, or "the additional
intrusion caused by the search was constitutionally irrelevant" to
the pervasive invasion of privacy resulting from his arrest. 6' The
Court rejected out of hand the first prong of this argument by dryly
observing that "this reasoning would impermissibly convict the
suspect even before the evidence against him was gathered. "62 It
found the second prong "hardly tenable in light of the extensive
nature of this search." 63 Furthermore, although an arrestee may
have "a lessened right of privacy in his person," this reduction
58. State v. Mincey, 115 Ariz. 472, 482. 566 P.2d 273, 283 (1977). The Supreme Court of
Arizona did concede, however, that the search did not fall within any of the usual exigent cir-
cumstances exceptions to the warrant requirement. Id.
59. 389 U. S. 347.357(1967).
60. - U. S. at -. 98S. Ct. at 2412.
61. Id. at -. 98S. Ct. at 2413.
62. Id. (footnote omitted).
63. Id.
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does not extend to his entire house - an argument explicitly rejected
in Chimel v. California. 64
The second argument advanced in support of "Arizona's
categorical exception to the warrant requirement is that a possible
homicide presents an emergency situation demanding immediate
action.'' 6 The Court did not question "the right of the police to
respond to emergency situations. ",66 To the contrary, it endorsed
their right, upon arriving at the scene of a homicide, to "make a
prompt warrantless search of the area to see if there are other
victims or if a killer is still on the premises. ", 67 And the police,
"during the course of their legitimate emergency activities," will
be permitted to "seize any evidence that is in plain view. .... ''68
However, it found the emergency contention inapposite and
without premise, because "a warrantless search must be 'strictly
circumscribed by the exigencies which justify its initiation,' ",69
and it could not be seriously argued that this search, conducted after
all of the persons within the apartment had been located, and
stretched over a period of four days, "was justified by, any
emergency threatening life or limb . . . [or could] be rationalized in
terms of the legitimate concerns that justify an emergency
search. "70
The prosecution next pointed to the overriding public interest
in the prompt investigation of murder. Again, the Supreme Court
did not question the importance of this concern. It found, however,
that the investigation of other serious crimes carries with it a
comparable public interest. Thus, if the warrantless search of the
scene of a homicide is reasonable, then the same would pertain to
the warrantless search of the scene of a rape, a robbery, or a
burglary. At this point, " '[n]o consideration relevant to the
[f]ourth [a]mendment suggests any point of rational limitation' of
such a doctrine.' 7 1
Construing the state's overall argument to be one in the name
of efficiency and simplicity, the Court issued one of its most ringing
and compelling endorsements of the warrant requirement:
64. 395 U. S. 752. 766 n.12 (1969). See- U. S. at - 98 S. Ct. at 2413.
65. Id
66. Id.
67. Id. at -, 98 S. Ct.at 2414.
68. Id.
69. Id.. quoting with approval Terry v. Ohio. 392 U. S. 1.26 (1968).
70. Id.
71. Id.. quotin, with approvalChincl v. California. 395 U. S. 752. 766 (1969).
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Moreover, the mere fact that law enforcement
may be made more efficient can never by itself
justify disregard of the [flourth [a]mendment ...
The investigation of crime would always be
simplified if warrants were unnecessary. But the
[M]ourth [a]mendment reflects the view of those who wrote
the Bill of Rights that the privacy of a person's home and
property may not be totally sacrificed in the name of
maximum simplicity in enforcement of the criminal
law. . . . For this reason, warrants are generally
required to search a person's home or his person
unless 'the exigencies of the situation' make the
needs of law enforcement so compelling that the
warrantless search is objectively reasonable under
the [f]ourth [a]mendment.1 2
Noting that except for the fact that a homicide was under
investigation, the Court emphasized the absence of any exigent
circumstances in this case. For example, there was "no indication
that evidence would be lost, destroyed or removed during the time
required to obtain a search warrant. Indeed, the police guard at the
apartment minimized that possibility. And there is no suggestion
that a search warrant could not easily and conveniently have been
obtained."7 3 In this posture, then, the Court was left with only the
seriousness of the offense under investigation to justify a
warrantless search under exigent circumstances. This it declined to
do. 74
The final argument advanced in support of the search was the
protection afforded by the guidelines set forth in the decision of the
Supreme Court of Arizona. The Court found this difficult to
accept, "[i]n light of the extensive search that took place in this
case. . . . 1'75 Furthermore, it hardly found the "so-called
guidelines" as "rigidly confining" as the state interpreted them to
be. To the contrary, the Court interpreted them as conferring
"unbridled discretion upon the individual officer to interpret such
72. Id. (citations omitted) (emphasis added). Among such "compelling needs" are the search
incident exception. hot pursuit of a fleeing suspect, and the imminent destruction of evidence. Id.
Since the need to conduct a warrantless search ofa home must be "compelling," and since a home
occupies a special position in the fourth amendment scheme of the protection of privacy interests, the
burden of persuasion to justify such conduct should be equally compelling: by proof beyond a
reasonable doubt.
73. Id. at - 98 S. Ct. at 2414-15 (emphasis added).
74. Id. at-. 98 S. Ct. at 2415.
75. Id.
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terms as 'reasonable search,' 'serious personal injury with
likelihood of death where there is reason to suspect foul play,' and
'reasonable period.' ''76 And it was "precisely this kind of
judgmental assessment of the reasonableness and scope of a proposed
search that the [f]ourth [a]mendment requires be made by a
neutral and objective magistrate, not a police officer." 77
In conclusion, the Court reiterated that even if the
circumstances described by the lower court would usually warrant a
constitutional search "of substantial scope," the fourth
amendment required that "this judgment in each case be made in the first
instance by a neutral magistrate. "18 Thus, Mincey stands for the
proposition that if an individual is arrested in his residence and
removed therefrom, a subsequent warrantless search thereof under
circumstances which pose no threat either to the safety of the
searching officers or of the removal or destruction of incriminating
evidence, and which demonstrate that the police have sufficient
manpower available to adequately secure the premises while a
readily obtainable warrant is sought, is unreasonable.
A number of guiding principles and criteria emerge from
Mincey. The first of these is the rejection of the "crime scene"
exception to the warrant requirement. Simply put, there is no
correlation between the seriousness of a crime and exemption from
the warrant requirement.7 9 Second, the duration of an emergency
search will be limited strictly to the continued existence of the
exigencies which justified its initiation. This will effectively
preclude warrantless investigative searches after the scene of an
emergency has been secured and during the period required to seek
an easily obtainable warrant. Third, the Court will particularly
scrutinize any claims of reasonableness attaching to warrantless
searches of private residences, and will not entertain a reduction of
warrant standards for residential searches. 80 And, finally, among
the recognized criteria for determining the existence of an
emergency are the immediate - and urgent - need at the scene of
a crime for the police to search for both victims and suspects; the
search incident exception; "hot pursuit" of a fleeing suspect; the
imminent loss, destruction, or removal of evidence, either prior to
seeking a warrant or while one is being obtained; the degree of
76. Id.
77. Id. (emphasis added).
78. Id. (eiphasis added). .-tccohd...hnson v. United States. '333 U. S. 10. 13-14 (1948)(Jackson.
J.
79. This w ill cffc, -ti\c rtcimic a crucial utde[pitiling of atithorities supporting the "right- of
. , d.-it (
80. So- Unted States %-. s. ni . e. Firere. 428 U. S. at 561. 565 (tliCI iti).
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availability of law enforcement officers to secure the premises and
preserve the evidential integrity of the scene; and the degree of
availability, and accessibility, of a magistrate.
Although Mincey left open the question of what, if any,
evidence was seized reasonably under established fourth
amendment standards, 8' the opinion of the Court indicated very
clearly that there can be no emergency justification for search-and-
seizure activities that cannot be "rationalized in terms of the
legitimate concerns that justify an emergency search. "82 Since the
Court spelled out those "concerns" in great detail, the lower courts
will be required henceforth to examine the legality of any claimed
emergency search against the standard of reasonableness
announced in Mincey.
In line with Mincey, the Eighth Circuit, relying upon Chimel,
has ruled that police evidence technicians may not gain warrantless
entry immediately or shortly after the initial entry, while
investigative control of the premises is still current, and after
termination of the emergency, even though the subsequent intrusion
is limited to the scope of or the purpose for the original invasion. 83 ,
A contrary position has been adopted by the Fifth Circuit, arguing
that the justification for such an investigative search is that since an
emergency sanctions an official invasion of individual privacy, the
individual thereby loses his reasonable expectation of privacy to the
extent of the invasion. 84
This position taken by the Fifth Circuit is untenable. In the
first place, it can no longer withstand analysis as a result of the
Supreme Court's holding in Mincey. Secondly, it confuses an
emergency with an investigative search. As has been noted, 85 each
involves a separate, although sequentially related, set of factors.
Therefore, the reasonable expectation of privacy lost to an
emergency is unrelated to that which would be breached by an
investigative search, and is immediately restored after the
termination of the exigency and prior to the initiation of the search.
Thirdly, there does not appear to be any logical limit to the number
of such searches. The only precondition is that investigative control
81. - U. S. at -. 98 S. Ct. at 2415 n.9.
82. Id. at-. 98S. Ct. at 2414.
83. United States x. Young. 553 F.2d 1132. 1134 (8th Cir. 1977). cert. denied. 431 U. S. 959
(1977).
84. United States v. Brand, 556 F.2d 1312, 1317 & n.9 (5th Cir. 1977), cert. denied. - U. S.
98 S. Ct. 1237 (1978). See People v. Superior Court, 41 Cal, App. 3d 636, 640-41, 116 Cal. Rptr.
24. 26-27 (2d Dist. 1974): People v. Wallace. 31 Cal. App. 3M 865. 871 107 Cal. Rptr. 659. 662 (1st
Dist. 1973). Lonquest v. State. 495 P.2d 575, 578-79 (Wyo. 1972). cert. denied. 409 U. S. 1006 (1972).
85. See text at - supra.
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of the premises remain current. Such a situation is too pregnant
with the potential for abuse and harassment. Finally, such a
doctrine does violence to one of the cardinal tenets of fourth
amendment law: The decision to search, in the absence of an
emergency, requires that a neutral magistrate be interposed
between the citizen and the police, and that in each case this
judgment be made in the first instance by only a detached judicial
officer. 86 Thus, in the absence of evidence demonstrating the
unfeasibility of obtaining a warrant, warrantless investigative
searches, after the termination of an emergency, should not be
sanctioned.
IV. THE ISSUE OF RE-ENTRY
Re-entry of the scene of a crime represents either a delayed or
a resumed investigative search, for, invariably, it has as its prime
purposes a determination of the circumstances pertaining to the
incident that justified the initial presence, and a search for evidence
of crime. As such, then, it will be governed primarily by the same
principles that attach to the investigative search, with due regard
given to certain factors of geography and available law enforcement
resources that particularly impact upon re-entry. It will not always
be effected by the same officers who gained initial entry. Since it
results either from a joint effort of two or more investigative
agencies, or from those of members of the same department, it will
be viewed as representing a successive presence. And, since factual
issues are so crucial to a proper assessment of this problem, it
particularly lends itself to a case-by-case analysis. Finally, in
approaching and analyzing these cases, it will behoove the reader to
keep uppermost in mind the crucial role played by the warrant
requirement in preserving the privacy of the home.
Although a variety of reasons has been advanced in support of
the "right" of re-entry, the primary one appears to be the
seriousness of the crime under investigation. Thus, in State v.
Oakes, 87 the police entered the defendant's residence in response to
a call from him in which he stated, "She's here on the floor,
dying." As they approached the house by way of the kitchen
entrance, the police could see the defendant through the glass in the
Af. See Mincev v. Arizona. - U. S. at -. 98 S. Ct. at 2415: McDonald v. United States. 335
U.S. at 455-56;.Johnson v. United States, 333 U.S. at 13-14.
87. 129 Vt. 241. 276 A,2d 18 (1971). crt. denied, 404 U. S. 965 (1971),
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upper part of the door. He was kneeling over a woman lying on the
kitchen floor. The officers entered through the unlocked kitchen
door and were informed by the defendant that he had accidently
shot his wife "with a 22-410 over and under."
One of the officers went into an adjoining room to look for
something to cover the glass in the kitchen door. He observed that
an ironing board was set up there and on it was a 22-410 over and
under rifle. A short time later a physician arrived and examined the
body. When he pronounced the woman dead, the defendant
became violent and had to be subdued with handcuffs.
Approximately an hour later, he was removed to the police station,
along with the rifle, ammunition, and a cartridge belt.
The police returned to the residence twice the next day to
continue their investigation. The first time, some seven hours after
their initial entry, they effected a warrantless entry and took
additional photographs, as they had exhausted their supply of flash
bulbs during the initial visit. The second re-entry was made
approximately five hours after the first, and was secured under the
authority of a search warrant. During this last visit, the police
seized an expended shell casing and photographed it.
Although the defendant conceded the legality of the initial
entry, he attacked the police presence the following day, arguing
that the first re-entry required a warrant, and that justification for
the search warrant issued for the second re-entry was defective and
invalid.
In sustaining the denial of suppression, the Supreme Court of
Vermont agreed that the initial entry was valid, 88 and recognized
that the issue of the legality of the subsequent entries hinged on
whether the initial legality terminated before the return visits.
Certainly, during the initial visit, the officers, being confronted
with a corpse that had been the victim of a gunshot wound, had a
duty to initiate and conduct an investigation on the premises.
Attendant upon this duty was the right to conduct a search for and
seizure of the weapon, ammunition, and any spent shells. 89 Since
the officers were there with the consent of the defendant, the issue
of unreasonable invasion of privacy under the fourth amendment
was irrelevant. Therefore, the evidence seized during the initial
presence was properly admissable at trial. 90
88. Id, at-. 276 A.2d at 24.
89. Id.
90. Id. at -, 276 A.2d at 25. The rifle, which was crucial to a conviction and which was not
discovered as the result ofan investigative search for evidence and the circumstances surrounding the
shooting, was also admissable under the doctrine of "plain view" during the performance by the
police of energency duties. See Mincey' v*. Arizona. - U. S. at -. 98 S. Ct. at 2414.
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The fact that the investigation which was interrupted at 1 a.
m. and the premises locked up, then resumed at 6 a. m. the same
morning, was without constitutional moment to the court, for the
investigation remained, for practical purposes, "continuous and
sequential." Therefore, based on those facts and the fact that the 6
a. m. investigation involved routine matters associated with
charges connected with the shooting, neither it nor the 11 a. m.
return required the authority of a warrant. 91 In short, the officers
were not conducting a search either for secreted objects or for
evidence of other crimes.
The opinion reiterated the importance attaching to homicide
invesigations and recognized that the emergency nature of the
situation would have permitted a forced warrantless entry to
conduct a thorough investigation into the suspicious circumstances
surrounding the discovery of the body. This being so, the officers
had authority to enter and "a duty to complete their investigation
of the occurrence. " ,92
Finally, the court took note of the fact that the discontinuity of
the investigation was due in some measure to the limitations on
manpower and expertise implicit in criminal investigations in most
Vermont villages. Additionally, the presence of a prosecutor is
often required, and this usually means a trip from some other part
of the county in which the investigation is being conducted. These
limitations, although they result in unavoidable delays and
interruption of police presence at the scene of the crime, will not
"undercut" the right of the police to complete their investigation
within a reasonable period, or require a renewed authority to re-
enter. 
93
The reasoning in Oakes is faulty for a number of reasons. In the
first place, it confuses an emergency with an investigative search.
The emergency justified the initial presence, and would have
permitted an examination of the premises for other victims.
However, once the emergency had ended, the defendant was in
custody, and the premises locked up, no further warrantless
searches pursuant to either an emergency or consent were justified.
Certainly, an invitation to enter does not extend to a full-blown
search of a residence, or to re-entries. 94 The emergency is the cause
for the investigative search, but does not justify it in the absence of
91. 12) \t. at -. 276 A.2d at 25.
92. Id.
93. Id. Accord, Brown %v. State. 475 S. W. 2d 938. 949-50 (Tex. Crim. App. 1971).
94. The court in Oakes attempted to distinguish Chimc/ on the basis of consent.
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a separate set of exigent circumstances, such as the actual or
threatened imminent loss, destruction, or removal of evidence, or
the unavailability of a magistrate. In short, an emergency search is
"strictly circumscribed by the exigencies which justify its
initiation,"9 and must end with the termination of its supporting
basis. The investigative search, without benefit of a warrant, will
not be permitted to take its place and resume where it has left off.
Thus, there is no continuity, as the opinion in Oakes implicitly
assumed, between the end of an emergency search and the
initiation of a warrantless investigative search.
The attempt in Oakes to form a correlating nexus between the
seriousness of a crime and exemption from the warrant
requirement must fail also. This argument rests on nothing more
than an apperal to maximumize efficiency and simplicity in the
investigation of crime. The net result will be the total sacrifice of
the privacy of the individual's home and property in favor of the
unbridled discretion of law officers. 96
Finally, the *attempt to justify the re-entries on the basis of
meager investigative and manpower resources will not stand.
Again, it represents but an appeal to efficiency and simplicity
without regard to the sanctity of the home or the availability of a
neutral magistrate. Furthermore, it attempts to forfeit basic
constitutional protections in the name of economic necessity. It is
dfficult to conceive of a more pernicious doctrine in the law of
search and seizure.
An issue relative to both re-entry and the investigative search
concerns the availability of a magistrate. In Stevens v. State, 97 the
issue raised was whether a re-entry some ten hours after the initial
legal entry in response to an emergency call was constitutionally
fatal to the admissibility of evidence thereby obtained.
A local chief of police of an isolated frontier village located on
an island off the coast of southeastern Alaska, in response to a
telephone call early in the morning from a neighbor advising that
there had been a shooting in the defendant's home, proceeded to
the residence and was admitted after knocking on the door. The
chief found the defendant who was sobbing and who stated that he
had shot his "buddy." Thereupon, the chief placed the defendant
under arrest and removed him from the scene. Later, the chief
returned and viewed the body of the decedent. After conducting a
95. Terry v. Ohio, 392 U. S. 1, 26 (1968). Accord, Mincey v. Arizona, - U. S. at -98 S. Ct.
at 2414.
96. - U. S. at - 98 S. Ct. at 2 414-15.
97. 443 P.2d 600 (Alaska 1968), cert denied, 393 U. S. 1039 (1969).
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superficial inspection, he locked the house with a padlock. The
chief then conferred with the mayor, who placed a telephone call to
the state police in Juneau. The time of the call was 3 a. in., and the
state police advised that the premises should remain locked. At the
first winter daylight, which was at approximately 10 a. m., state
troopers and the district attorney departed Juneau by air for the
defendant's residence and entered to search the same after the chief
of police had unlocked the door. During this interval, access had
been denied to both the defendant and his wife. The residence was
subjected to a thorough investigative search notwithstanding the
lack of a warrant.
The defendant unsuccessfully moved to suppress the evidence
seized during the second re-entry, and was subsequently convicted.
On appeal, the Supreme Court of Alaska affirmed. 98
The defendant did concede that the initial entry was legal.
With this concession, the appellate court agreed, observing that an
emergency existed which justified a warrantless entry. 99 Thus, the
fact that the chief had not been invited into the home was without
constitutional significance. 10 Since he was confronted with a
homicide, it was the chief's duty to conduct an investigation and to
inspect the premises. This inspection would have included all of the
police activities conducted some ten hours later. Thus, there could
be no question but that if these activities had been executed then
and there, no fourth amendment interests would have been
violated. 1'
The issue, then, centered on the ten-hour interval between the
initial entry and the eventual seizure. The court resolved this
against the defendant, arguing that the chief of police of a small
frontier village is not necessarily a competent officer to conduct the
type of investigation of a homicide which is required to protect the
interests of society. 102 Furthermore, in the more populous urban
areas an officer discovering a homicide could remain at the scene
until the arrival of trained investigators within a short period of
time. Therefore, in the usual case, the interval between the initial
legal entry and the commencement of the investigation will not be
so unreasonable as to affect the legality of the subsequent
warrantless presence. 10 3
98. Stevens .State. 443 P.2d 600 (Alaska 1968). cert denied. 393 U. S. 1039 (1969).
99. Id. at 602.
100. Id.
101. Id.
102. Id. at 602-03.
103. Id at 603.
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The court felt that the situation confronting the chief of police
was not at all typical. Here, the homicide was discovered during the
early hours of the morning in an isolated frontier village located on
an island off the coast of southeastern Alaska. Neither a magistrate,
a coroner, nor trained police assistance was readily available. 10 4
The chief had no alternative but to lock the premises and take the
defendant into custody. The state police departed by air for the
island at the first winter daylight, and, upon arrival, immediately
commenced their investigation at the scene of the crime. Thus, the
court concluded, there was neither an avoidable delay in initiating
the investigation nor a violation of the defendant's constitutional
right to privacy. 105
The court in Stevens was quite correct in noting that a
magistrate was not available on the island. But this does not mean
that a magistrate was unavailable to the chief of police. The chief
was conducting a joint investigation with the state police. Both the
state police and a magistrate were available in Juneau. Telephone
contact had been made with the state police in Juneau. Therefore,
at that time, the information relayed by the chief could have been
incorporated into an affidavit by the state police as the hearsay in-
formation and observations of another officer engaged in a joint
criminal investigation, and would have formed an adequate basis
for the issuance of a search warrant before the investigating party
was dispatched to the scene of the crime. 10 6 In short, a magistrate
was as readily available as were the state police. If it was reasonable
for the latter to have effected warrantless re-entry some ten hours
after the initial entry, it was equally reasonable to have sought a
warrant during this interval from a readily available magistrate. In
reality, then, it could not be argued that a warrant was not readily
obtainable.107
Stevens represents but another attempt by a court to find a
correlation between the seriousness of a crime and exemption from
the warrant requirment. The court made no attempt to
differentiate between an emergency search and an investigative
search. The opinion did, however, add a new wrinkle to this
argument. It attempted to further justify exemption from the
warrant requirement in the name of police incompetence. This is
104. Both a magistrate and state police experts, however, were available inJuneau, from where,
in fact. the investigating party was dispatched to the scene of the crime. Id.
105. Id. The concurring opinion characterized the second re-entry as but a continuation of the
search begun during the initial entry. Id. at 606 (RabinowitzJ., concurring).
106. See United States v. Ventresca, 380 U. S. 102. 111 (1965).
107. Or not easily obtainable. See Mincey v. Arizona, - U. S. at -, 98 S. Ct. at 2415.
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analogous to the argument, rejected in Mincey that attempted to
justify such exemption in the name of police efficiency. 08 If, in fact,
the chief of police was incompetent to conduct the investigation of a
homicide, that is not the fault of the defendant; and it is certainly
no justification for penalizing one accused of crime by attempting
to impair his basic constitutional protections.
Furthermore, there was no indication that evidence would
have been lost, destroyed, or removed during the time required to
obtain a search warrant. Indeed, the facts pointed to the contrary,
demonstrating that throughout the interval the evidential integrity
of the scene of the crime had been preserved. The premises had
been, and remained, locked, and both the defendant and his wife
had been denied access thereto.
Finally, the absence of sufficient investigative resources misses
the point. Once the emergency involving the homicide terminated,
the premises locked, and the defendant placed in custody, the
justification for the warrantless presence ceased; and re-entry,
which could "hardly be rationalized in terms of the legitimate
concerns that justify an emergency search," 109 could be sanctioned
only under authority of a warrant. Otherwise, the warrant
requirement would be dependent upon the degree of availability of
investigative resources after the termination of an exigency, which
would reduce the requirement to a nullity. 1 10
The desire to sustain the validity of the investigative search
and the right of re-entry has led one court to expand them into a
judicially created doctrine of extended or continued investigative
presence and control. Thus, in People v. Neulist,'1 the appellate
court reversed an order of suppression on the ground that since the
premises were secured by the posting of police guards throughout
the period of the interval, the warrantless re-entry and searches
were "but an extension or continuation of the initial investigation"
of the scene of the crime over which the police had maintained a
continued and proper presence and control. 112
The facts revealed that the police effected an initial warrantless
108. Id. at -, 98 S. Ct. at 2414.
109. Id.
110. The opinion in Strerns appeared to contain undercurrents of a geographic approach to the
doctrine of emergency. so that the more isolated the locale of a crime, the greater the duration of the
exigency. However. this could have relevance only to the degree ofavailability ofa magistrate. Since
the opinion revealed that the magistrate was as available as the state police were. there would have
been no basis for proposing such an approach.
111. 43 A. D.2d 150. 350 N. Y. S.2d 178 (Sup. Ct.. App. Div.. 2d Dept. 1973), rov'e, 72 Misc,
2d 140. 338 N. Y. S.2d 794 (Nassau Ctv. Ct. 1972).
112. People \. Neulist. 43 A. D.2d 150. -. 350 N. Y. S.2d 178. 183 (Sup. Ct., App. Div.. 2d
Dept. 1973).
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entry in response to a telephone call from the decedent's son report-
ing his mother's death. The medical examiner was called, and he
made a preliminary diagnosis of an aneurysm as the cause of death.
It was necessary, however, for the body to be removed in order that
an autopsy might be performed. After leaving the scene, but
keeping an officer posted at the premises to stand guard, with in-
structions to allow no one to enter the bedroom where the body had
been discovered, the remaining officers returned to headquarters,
where they subsequently learned from the medical examiner that
the decedent, who had been found in bed, her face and head in a
pool of blood, had been shot. In the meantime, the defendant-
husband had gone to his mother's home. Realizing for the first time
that they were dealing with a homicide, the police officers returned
to the scene, after an absence of less than an hour, and again on the
following day, and conducted intensive warrantless searches of the
residence. Throughout this whole period, the premises remained
posted. Although no fewer than four search warrants had been ob-
tained on the day the body was discovered to search for the murder
weapon,tt 3 no warrant was ever sought to search the residence. The
issue raised was the legality of the warrantless searches after the
police realized that they were conducting a homicide investigation
involving the use of firearms.
The appellate court reasoned that the initial absence of the of-
ficers, for less than an hour during which the body had been
removed for the purpose of an autopsy, did not signify that the in-
vestigation had been completed or that the police had relinquished
control over the premises. Since the preliminary diagnosis of an
aneurysm as the cause of death was merely tentative and had not
ruled out the possibility of foul play, it could not be said that the in-
vestigation of the scene had been completed. Certainly, if the bullet
wound had been discovered before rather than after the officers had
absented themselves, a complete and thorough search of the
premises would have been warranted. Discerning no viable legal
distinction between the two situations, the court concluded that
"[c]ommon sense calls for the same result in both cases. '114
This conclusion was reinforced by the continued police
presence through the posted guard and the relatively brief
interruption of the investigation, which immediately resumed after
the cause of death had been established through the results of the
113. rhe warrants authorized the police to search for the weapon in the home of the defendant's
mother, in his two offices, and in his automobile. 72 Misc. 2d at - 338 N. Y. S2d at 808.
114. 43 A. D.2d. at-, 350 N. Y. S.2d at 184.
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autopsy.I15 Therefore, it could not be claimed that there had in fact
been a re-entry, and the posting of the guard did not constitute an
act of trespass."t 6 Additionally, on the facts presented it could not
be claimed that the police had resorted to the device of the "delayed
search. ''117
Finally, the court recognized that in homicide cases the police
should be accorded great leeway "both in terms of the element of
time and in the permissible scope of their investigation." This
mandated a duty on the part of the investigating officers to
thoroughly examine the scene of the crime, which, in this case, the
court deemed to encompass the entire house.118  Such an
examination would constitute both reasonable and restrained
investigative activity. 119
In contrast to the position adopted by the appellate court, the
trial court argued that there was a distinction between an
emergency search and an investigative search. It acknowledged
that when law enforcement officers are engaged in a search
prompted by an emergency quest for a body, then may seize any
relevant evidence in open view which is "upon" or "near" the
body.1 20 Thus, they may lawfully enter private premises without
benefit of a warrant to investigate and to render first aid.1 21 In fact,
the trial court recognized the circumstances of gaining entry for the
purposes of rendering aid and investigating a reported death as
qualifying under the emergency exception as a matter of law. 122
Initially, the authorities had thought that the defendant's wife had
died from natural causes. After the majority of them had left the
scene and subsequently learned that she was the victim of a gunshot
wound, they recognized the potential criminal implications of the
incident. It was at this point that a new area of inquiry developed,
one that flowed away from the emergency and first aid aspects that
predominated during the first visit. 123 The police now became
involved in the possible detection and apprehension of a criminal.
Furthermore, the trial court rejected the argument advanced by the
prosecution that the re-entry and search could be justified under
115. Id.
116. Id. at -, 350 N. Y. S.2d at 184-85. Although the court attempted to disavow the presence
of a re-entry. its theory of "extension or continuation of the initial investigation," id. at -, 350 N,
Y. S.2d at 183, would certainly have legitimated such an occurence.
117. Id. at - 350 N. Y. S.2d at 185. Even ifthis were conceded, the fact remains that the police
had engaged in warrantless investigative searches after the termination of the emergency.
118. Id.
119. Id.
120. 72 Misc. 2d at-. 338 N. Y. S.2d at 807.
121. Id.
122. Id. at 338 N. Y. S.2d at 807-808.
123. Id. at-. 338 N. Y. S. 2d at 808.
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the theory of continued "on-the-scene" search, reasoning that the
posting of the policeman was for the purpose of preserving the
scene of the crime in an undisturbed state and to prevent the
unauthorized removal of evidence while a warrant might be
sought. 124 And, since they had sought, and obtained, four warrants
to search for the weapon, they certainly had enough time and
probable cause to have obtained one for the defendant's home, the
scene of the crime. 25 The trail court was thus left with the fruits of
a general exploratory search for anticipated evidence of an
incriminating nature. 26 In conclusion, the trial court, while
acknowledging the gravity of a murder investigation, cautioned
that "the gravity of a crime is not the criteria [sic] for a warrantless
search under the exception of the exigent circumstances rules."1 27
In any event, "the processes of law enforcement must at all times
conform to constitutional standards and not seek shortcuts which
inevitably result in the legal spoilage of otherwise important
evidence. "i28
Neulist represents an excellent example of how courts can
arrive at diametrically opposite conclusions depending on the
degree of their allegiance to the teachings of Chimel. The appellate
opinion is clearly at odds with Chimel. At the time of re-entry, no
emergency existed. It is true that the police realized for the first
time that they were faced with a homicide-one appearing to
involve "foul play." However, the premises had already been
secured by the posting of the guard, the defendant had gone to his
mother's home, and the guard was instructed to allow no one to
enter the bedroom where the body had been discovered. 129 Thus,
there was no threat of destruction or removal of evidence.
Furthermore, the argument that the scene of the crime "should be
deemed to include the entire house, ' '1 30 when it was obvious that
the crime had taken place in the bedroom, defies logic and
represents an open invitation to the general search in the name of a
general emergency that, in fact, was limited both as to place and
duration. Finally, the appellate opinion confused the differing
periods and roles of the emergency search and of the investigative
124. Id.
125. Id.
126. Id. at -, 338 N. Y. S.2d at 809.
127. Id. at .338 N. Y. S.2d at 810, clearly presaging the rule announced in Mincey v. Arizona,
- U. S. at-, 98 S. Ct. at 2414-15.
128. 72 Misc. 2d at -, 338 N. Y. S.2d at 810. The trial court was impelled to its order of sup-
pression by its interpretation of the current fourth amendment principles of privacy espoused in
ChimeL Id. at -, 338 N. Y. S.2cl at 811.
129.43 A. D.2d at-. 350 N. Y. S.2d at 181.
130. Id. at -, 350N. Y. S.2d at 185.
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search. In sum, sanctioning the unbridled investigative search
amounts to an endorsement of the general exploratory search for
evidence of crime.
Re-entry is such a drastic intrusion upon the sanctity of the
home, and is so pregnant with the potential for abuse and
harassment, due to the fact that it confers upon the individual
officer the right to substitute an unbridled discretion for the
detached judgment of the neutral magistrate, that it should be
rejected by the courts in the absence of a compelling justification. 131
This justification, however, will require more than an appearance of
necessity. Thus, in Norman v. State,132 the court premitted a re-entry
after a search incident to an arrest had ceased upon the discovery of
two bombs. The police exited the residence while awaiting the
arrival of an army bomb squad, but did post the premises. After the
squad had removed the devices, one of the officers re-entered the
dwelling, conducted a further search, and seized additional
evidence.
In sustaining the admissibility of this evidence, the appellate
court acknowledged that re-entry after the lapse of an unreasonable
period of time is illegal. 133 The court reasoned, however, that the
delay was caused by the discovery of the bombs, and that the search
incident to the defendant's arrest was promptly resumed and
completed after the devices had been removed. In short, "[t]he
final portion of the search after re-entry was merely a continuation
of the original search... ",134
The facts demonstrated a compelling need to vacate, but not to
re-enter, the building. The right to conduct a search incident to an
arrest is a very limited one. It is based upon a compelling need to
protect the arresting officer and to prevent the defendant from
escaping or destroying evidence.13 5 Here, however, the defendant
was already in custody and did not have access to the residence,
which was secured throughout the period of the interval.
131. As. for example, the unavailability of a magistrate, and the need to call in police
technicians and forensic experts to prevent the loss of certain types of evidence prior to the
reavailability of the magistrate. See Nlincey v. Arizona, - U. S. at -. 98 S. Ct. at 2414-15 (dictum):
id.at - 98 S. Ct. at 2421 (Rehnquist, j.. concurring & dissenting)(dictum). Re-entry, after a
reasonably brief period, will be permitted, however, for the purpose of allowing fire officials to com-
plete their investigation of the cause ofafirc (and not to seek evidence of crime) that is interrupted
because visibility is -severely hindered by darkness, steam, and smoke." Michigan v. Tyler. 98 S.
Ct. 1942. 1951 (1978). In such a situation, the re-entry will be considered but "an actual con-
tinuation" of the initial investigation. Id.
132. 302 So. 2d254((Miss. 1974). cert. denied, 421 U. S. 966 (1975).
133. Norman v. State, 302 So. 2d 254, 258 (Miss. 1974).
134. Id. This argument is highly analogous to those advanced in Stevens v. State. 443 P.2d 600
(Alaska 1968), cert. denied, 393 U. S. 1039 (1969). See notes 97-10 4 supra and accompanying text.
135. Chitiel v. California. 395 U. S. 752. 762-63 (1969).
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Furthermore, the time required to obtain the services of the bomb
squad could have been utilized to seek a warrant, as there was no
suggestion that a "warrant could not easily and conveniently have
been obtained. ' 136 Additionally, "[t]here was no indication that
evidence would be lost, destroyed, or removed during the time
required to obtain a search warrant. Indeed, the police guard at the
[dwelling] minimized that possibility." 13 7
The appearance of necessity in this case was based on the fact
that prior to the discovery of the bombs there had been a "shoot
out" on the premises while the police were attempting to execute
certain arrest warrants, 138 and that one of the persons for whom the
police had arrest warrants was considered by them to be
dangerous.139 However, a number of the occupants, including the
defendant, were already in custody prior to the initial cessation of
the search upon the discovery of the bomb devices, and were denied
access to the residence by the external posting of the premises while
the police awaited the arrival of the bomb squad. Even if the
potential for the destruction of evidence by occupants not yet in
custody existed, that threat was at its apogee during the interval
between the discovery of the devices and the re-entry. As to the
individual considered to be dangerous, this alleged danger existed
prior to and after the discovery of the bombs, and would have
remained so throughout the period of the interval. Yet, this
potential danger did not prevent the officer from re-entering the
dwelling and conducting an additional search. Again, if this threat
existed, it was at its apogee during the "shoot-out" prior to the
initiation of the first search, and not after its interruption. In short,
the actions of the police belie any such fear, and it is difficult to
understand why, or how, the obtainment of a search warrant would
have increased the danger to them. 140
The Court acknowledged that re-entry after the lapse of an
unreasonable period of time is illegal. 14' This will not serve to
invalidate a re-entry. What does is the transfer of the decision to
search from the magistrate to the officer.
Finally, it may well be that since the officer was only trying to
complete what he had started, this circumstance "would usually be
constitutionally sufficient to warrant a [resumption of the] search...
136. Mincey v. Arizona. - U. S. at -. 98 S. Ct. at 2415.
137, Id. at-, 98S. Ct. at 2414-15.
138. None ofw hich was for the defendant.
139. 302 So. 2d at 257.
140. This reasoning would apply equally to other dangerous criminals at large.
141 302 So. 2d at 258.
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But the Fourth Amendment requires that this judgment in each
case be made in the first instance by a neutral magistrate. ")142
The authorities that have denied re-entry appear to recognize
the primacy of the warrant clause, and have refused to subvert the
purposes of the warrant requirement in the name of "common
sense"'14 3 or an exaulted sense of police efficiency and investigative
simplicity. 144
In State v. Brothers, 145 the local chief of police, acting in his
capacity as an off-duty hours ambulance driver, answered a call for
help from the defendant's residence. Upon entering, he observed
the wife of the defendant with a gunshot wound in her right arm.
The chief accompanied the defendant and his wife to a hospital,
where the latter died. While at the hospital, the chief called the state
police, who went to and examined the premises. They then
delivered a key to the residence to the chief while he was still at the
hospital. Later that evening, the chief and other officers returned to
the residence, gained entry with the key, and proceeded to conduct
a photographic investigation and seize evidence of a crime. The
defendant was not present during the search and was not arrested
until two days later. Although some of the evidence seized was in
plain view, a rifle that was seized was discovered concealed in a
closet, and was subsequently offered at trial as the murder weapon.
A motion to suppress was denied on the theory that the chief
had authority to effect a warrantless re-entry as an authorized
medical investigator.
In reversing the denial of suppression, the appellate court
reasoned that under Chimel the police are required to obtain a
search warrant "in all but exceptional cases. A search can no longer
be justified by a finding that it was 'reasonable. ""11 46 Applying this
test to the facts at hand, the court observed that the police had
probable cause to search the defendant's residence. However, it
was equally clear that no emergency existed which would have
obviated the necessity of obtaining a warrant. 147 The burden rested
with the prosecution to excuse the need for a warrant. There was no
indication that an attempt had been made to contact a magistrate,
or that any evidence would have been disposed of while a warrant
142. Mince, v. Arizona. 98 S. Ct. at 2415.
143. As one court has done. See People v. Netlist. 43 A. D.2d 150. 350 N. Y. S.2d 178, 184
(Sup. Ct.. App. Div.. 2d Dept. 1973).
144. This the Supreme Court will not countenance. Mincey v. Arizona. - U. S. at -. 98 S.
C;. at 2414.
145. 4 Ore. App. 253. 478 P.2d 442 (1970).
146. State %. Brothers. 4 Ore. App. 253. -. P.2d 442. 444 (1970) (emphasis added).
147. Id.
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was being sought. The residence was locked, the defendant was at
the hospital, and the police waited two-and-one-half hours before
making the search. There was no basis, therefore, for justifying an
emergency or an immediate search. 1
48
In Sample v. Eyman, 149 the court ruled that a warrantless re-
entry into an empty residence two hours after the defendant had
been removed on probable cause to the police station, and during
which period the premises had been posted with a police guard, was
unreasonable, as there was no danger that incriminating evidence
would have been concealed or destroyed. 150 Furthermore, there
was no other evidence pointing to an emergency, and the search
had not been conducted contemporaneously with the arrest. 15'
Although conceding the absence of exigent circumstances and
the availability of a magistrate, which would have made a search
warrant easily obtainable, the dissent nevertheless argued that
under "the total atmosphere" of this case, it was reasonable for the
police to have conducted a warrantless search of a dwelling where a
homicide had been recently committed. 152
And, in State v. Davidson, 5 3 a case which involved a
prosecution for murder, the court invalidated a warrantless police
re-entry three days after the discovery of the victim because of the
absence of any compelling reasons therefor. 154 This was especially
so in view of the fact that the police possessed sufficient probable
cause for the issuance of a search warrant, and the evidence seized
during the re-entry was merely cumulative of what the police had
discovered and seized during the initial entry. 155
Finally, In State v. Hardin,156 the court, in reversing an order of
suppression, had that a warrantless entry into a hotel room some
two-and-one-half hours after the commencement of a homicide
investigation in an adjacent room, qualified under the emergency
doctrine because the perpetrator was still at large and constituted
"'a substantial threat of imminent danger' to life' '1 57 sufficient to
148. Id.
149. 469 F.2d 819 (9th Cir. 1972)(onejudge dissenting).
150. Sample v. Eyman, 469 F.2d 819, 822 (9th Cir. 1972).
151. Id.
152. Id. at 824-25 (Jertberg, J., dissenting). It suffices here to say that this argument was rejec
ted in Mincey v. Arizona, - U. S. at - 98 S. Ct. at 
2414-15.
153. 44 Wis. 2d 177, 170 N. W. 2d 755 (1969).
154. State v. Davidson, 44 Wis. 2d 177, -, 170 N. W. 2d 755, 765 (1969).
155. Id. This latter reasoning is not persuasive. A warrantless re-entry will not be invalidated
because the police have sufficient probable cause to obtain a warrant, or because the evidence is
merely cumulative. It will be rejected because there is no compelling need for it, and because the
police have seen fit to needlessly substitute their discretion for the judgment of an impartial
magistrate.
156. 90 Nev. -. 518 P.2d 151 (1974).
157. State v. Hardin. 90 Nev. -, -, 518 P.2d 151, 154(1974).
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justify the entry for the purpose of conducting an interview and,
implicity, to determine the condition of the occupant and the
potential presence of the assailant. 15 8
At the subsequent trial, it was revealed for the first time that
the entry, which the Supreme Court of Nevada had sustained as a
reasonable exception to the warrant requirement, represented the
second, and not the first, entry; and that the results of the first
entry, having been made some two to two-and-one-half hours prior
to the re-entry for the purpose of checking on the safety of the
occupant, revealed that he, the subsequent defendant, was asleep
and in no apparent danger. It was only after an intensive
investigation of the other rooms on both the floor of the crime and
of that below, as well as an examination of the outside premises,
that the police returned to the defendant's room.
The case went to the jury, which could not agree upon a
verdict, leading to a mistrial. Prior to the second trial, the
defendant renewed his motion to suppress, based upon the trial
testimony concerning the re-entry, and was successful in having the
fruits of the search suppressed on the ground that at that point in
time the emergency had terminated. 59 This order led to the
dismissal of all charges against the defendant.
V. CONCLUSION
Within the sanctity of the home, Chimel v. California and Mincey
v. Arizona stand as a bulwark against the unbridled investigative
search. Once an emergency has come to an end, no investigative
search activity, whether engaged in immediately thereafter, or on a
delayed or deferred basis, should be countenanced in the absence of
a compelling justification. To do so would do violence to the
command that searches must be conducted within thejudicial processes.
As this study has demonstrated, the duration of an emergency
search must be rationalized in terms of the duration of the
legitimate concerns of "the exigencies which justify its
initiation.' ' 60 Finally, the investigative search and the drastic
remedy of re-entry must not be sanctioned after the termination of an
158. Id at - 518 P.2c at 154-55.
159. State v. Hardin. No. 24269 (8th Dist. Ct.. Dep't 6. Clark County. August 23. 1974). Fur-
thermore, at this point the search had taken on the aspects of a general exploratory search for
prioar ilyt C\ idential purposes.
lot). l'err Ohio, 392 U. S. at 26. Accord. Mincer v. Arizona. - U. S. at -. 98 S. Ct. at
241-,
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exigency, in the absence of a compelling need based upon ademonstrated showing of either the imminent or threateneddestruction, loss, or removal of seizable evidence or of the
unfeasibility of obtaining a search warrant.

